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Rhetoric is no stranger to disability; and disability is intimate, albeit anxiously, 
with rhetoric. In this essay, we wish to illustrate that premise as we elaborate on 
some of the ways that rhetoric might add both depth and breadth to disability studies. 
We will focus on key moments or conventions in rhetoric's three largest sub-fields -
the history of rhetoric, rhetorical theory, and rhetorical criticism - and illustrate some 
of the generative ways rhetoric can explain, question, critique, and theorize disability 
from within those three areas. 
Rhetoric's History and Disability 
Throughout its 2500 year history, rhetoric has never been particularly 
friendly to the disabled, the deformed, the deaf or mute, the less-than-perfect in 
voice, expression or stance. In fact, until fairly recently, one could, without much 
injustice, define rhetoric as the cultivation and perfection of performative, expressive 
control over oneself and others. Though rhetorical theory has always devoted much, 
perhaps most, of its attention to the purely conceptual activities of inventing and 
arranging the "available means of persuasion," it can never completely lose sight 
of the oral, performative communication of these means. Thus, in addition to the 
categories of "invention" and "arrangement" - steps in the composing of a speech -
was the category of "delivery," which defined not only proper pronunciation and 
accent, but gesture, facial expression and general bodily deportment as well. (1) 
And while rhetoricians almost never afforded the canon of delivery, or actio, the 
same attention as they did inventio (invention), many orators were willing to admit 
that the performance of a speech was the most important aspect of the art of 
persuasive speaking. (2) The orator Demosthenes, for example, called delivery the 
first, second and third most important components of eloquence, a pronouncement 
which Cicero upheld. The persuasive power of a well-conceived and composed 
oration could be lost with a poor delivery, while, on the contrary, an effective delivery 
could overcome many faults in a composition. 
While the particular principles, rules and proscriptions that make up the art 
of rhetoric vary from one age to the next, rhetoricians and orators took for granted 
that anyone who hoped to control the will of an audience had first to control their 
own voice and body. Most important to the delivery of a speech was the energy and 
propriety of the orator's voice and body: it must convey the force of the speaker's 
passionate conviction ,without transgressing cultural codes of conduct and 
deportment. Ifdeformities or infirmities warranted a well-deserved death by exposure 
or "euthanasia" for Aristotle, it was much more the case that orators must be well-
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formed and not only fully but perfectly functioning. At its height in pre-Macedonian 
Greece and, later, in the Roman republic, the orator perfectus who led the nation by 
virtue of his publicly performed orations had to embody all the classical public 
virtues, including energy, willful self-control, and physical, intellectual and financial 
resourcefulness. Demosthenes, for example, one of the most famous of the Athenian 
"Attic" orators, was routinely upheld as an example of human virtue overcoming 
natural infirmity. 
Demosthenes, it seems, was born with a weak and stuttering voice. So 
shamed was he after his first oration that he shaved half of his head to prevent his 
going out in public while he practiced his delivery. His practice of declaiming with 
pebbles in his mouth, or over the roar of a pounding ocean surf - to overcome his 
natural speaking defects and to gain a more naturally powerful delivery - is one of 
the most well-rehearsed anecdotes in rhetorical history. Certainly it might also 
stand as an early example of rehabilitative "technologies." 
For the next two-thousand years, rhetoric has periodically added to, 
remodeled, or refurbished this classical model - the perfectly formed and fully 
franchised public representative - without substantially altering its foundations or 
structural supports. Roman rhetoric largely looked to, adopted and denounced, 
even in the act of borrowing, its Greek antecedents: Greek orators were upheld as 
models not only of excellent speaking, but excellent public action. Demosthenes 
became the paragon of the civic leader of the res publica: a public-minded citizen 
capable of uniting, and thereby constituting, a community behind him. This was 
the model for Cicero as well as for Hume; for Quintilian - an educator and rhetorician 
in the late Roman Empire - as well as for Thomas Jefferson. 
But, curiously, rhetoric. has, at the same time, itself been denounced as a 
disabling pursuit. To the degree that persuasion was worked on auditors through 
such non-rational avenues as stylistic figures, alliterative diction, or emphatic 
gestures, it crippled men's (audiences as well as speakers were routinely understood 
to be exclusively male) ability to deliberate coolly and rationally for themselves or 
to follow the truth, For philosophers like Plato as well as Christian apologists like 
St. Jerome, arts of persuasion were suspect for their ability to lead people away 
from the revealed truths of religion or the discovered truths of dialectic. Though 
rhetoric required perfectly functioning bodies, its detractors also condemned it for 
appealing to the body and the senses at all: rhetoric used and relied upon the 
audience's common - i.e. normal - senses, emotions and passions to effect its goals. 
But even a perfectly feeling body could be deemed irrelevant to pure philosophy or 
revealed religion. And when the pursuit of truth did admit of rhetoric's usefulness, 
perfect bodies were again invoked as the conditions upon which this use could be 
employed. Thus while St. Augustine championed classical rhetoric as useful to the 
conversion and edification of the faithful, their perfect hearing was essential to 
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their being accepted into the faith (On Christian Doctrine). And while Plato 
eventually accepts rhetoric as a "hand-maiden" to philosophy, he illustrates their 
difference through an ableist allegory of two horses pulling the chariot of the soul: 
one horse is perfect in form and loves the light, the other is "crooked, heavy, ill put 
together... his color dark ... is shaggy eared and deaf, hardly obedient to whips 
and spurs" (Phaedrus). (3) 
Bodily deformity thus at once prevented any rhetorical achievement while, 
at the same time, it symbolized the problem with rhetoric as a deceptive and sensuous 
art. When the canon of delivery received renewed attention in the elocution 
movement (roughly 1700-1900), this relationship went largely unchanged. 
Elocutionists (and rhetoricians in general) maintained the natural and immediate 
transmission of thoughts, feelings and beliefs through the stance, gestures, facial 
expressions, and vocal qualities of the performer. That blacks could not blush 
signaled an absence of shame; that cripples could not enact or voice their passions 
similarly signaled some inner spiritual or psychic lack. So pervasive was this 
Enlightenment fetish for bodily, performative signs of inner states, that we currently 
use elocutionary terms to indicate characteristics of selfhood and personal agency: 
"voice," "stance," "position," and "posture." Rhetoricians frequently either 
borrowed (stole) from deaf communities their gestural and expressive vocabularies 
for a hearing clientele and readership (John Bulwer, Juan Luis Vives), or they ignored 
or condemned sign and gesture in favor of rhetoric's most highly prized resource: 
fluent speech (Alexander Bell, James Rush). The long struggle of deaf activists 
against oralist education and therapy has its roots, historically, in rhetoric's 
elocutionary movement. In sum, the historical relationship between rhetoric and 
disability has hardly been either peaceful or productive. 
Rhetorical Theory 
Given disability's troubled position within the history of rhetoric, the 
question might become: why even bother to take a rhetorical approach to disability 
studies, to bring disability into rhetoric and rhetoric into disability? We think the 
answers lie in excavating rhetorical theory and rhetorical criticism, for what they 
are worth, in relation to disability. And in such excavating we would hope to rewrite 
not only the history, but possibly the present and future, of disability's place in 
rhetorical history. We would turn first to terms, the very bones of rhetorical theory. 
When we teach courses in rhetoric, or when we help graduate students prepare for 
Master's or Ph.D. exams in rhetoric, we find ourselves - for better or worse - with 
a list of master terms in hand. ( 4) Here we want to illustrate the potential power of 
rhetorical theory in disability studies by focusing on a few of these key terms. 
Persuasion would be as good a place to start as any. Like any discipline, 
rhetoric begins with defining itself. And in its beginning, in the first cited definition 
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for rhetoric given by Corax and Tisias in 467 BCE, persuasion figures prominently: 
"Rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion," they state simply. A hundred years later, 
in 350 BCE, Aristotle hands us what has become the "standard" definition for rhetoric 
and lie further aligns it with persuasion: "Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in 
each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion." Cicero (106-43 
BCE), reputedly the greatest of the Roman (if not all) orators, echoes: rhetoric is 
"the art of effective persuasion." And although during the next 2,500 years rhetoric 
often discarded "persuasion" in favor ofother more inclusive or more specific terms 
(rhetoric, like most disciplines, engages energetically in re-inventing the wheel), 
the alliance between rhetoric and "persuasion" remained strong. In the 20th century, 
our principal rhetoricians still imply persuasion as they name rhetoric with phrases 
like "to form attitudes or to induce actions" (Burke) or "gaining the adherence of 
minds" (Perelman). 
· To study the persuasion surrounding the construction and maintenance of 
disability - medically, aesthetically, linguistically, socially, economically, sexually 
(to name but a few) - would certainly be a fruitful endeavor. Questions we might 
begin with, generated by rhetorical definitions such as those offered above, include: 
Who are the "artificers" of disability? And how do they become so? What are all 
the "available means of persuasion" when disability is argued about? How do 
those differ from the existing means or the effective means? How is persuasion 
used to "form attitudes" or "induce actions" or "gain the adherence of minds" 
concerning disability? When rhetoricians study persuasion and attempt to answer 
questions like these they often turn more specific, microscopic lens onto certain 
other terms and configurations of rhetoric in order to help them then draw the 
bigger persuasive picture. They look, for example, using Aristotle as their guide, at 
the three classical appeals (piste is) - logos, or the logic of the argument; pathos, or 
the passions of the audience; and ethos, the character of the speaker. How (and 
why, when, and where) is the argument "logically" made (logos)? Who is the 
audience of disability discourses, and how are they appealed to "emotionally" 
(pathos)? How does the character of the speaker or writer get "built" and "delivered" 
(ethos)? To carry out the equation with disability in place: How (and why, when, 
and where) is~ construction of disability established as logical? How is disability 
emotionally presented? (Why are its emotional tropes so limited to pity, depravation, 
degradation, inspiration and the like? What weight do these emotions carry in our 
culture?) And finally, what of the character of the disabled person - or of those who 
persuade about disability, whether disabled or not? How does their ethos contribute 
to the persuasive endeavor? (We might consider, as but one case, the arguments 
about who can do disability studies in the first place.) 
We might also consider the "commonplaces" of arguments surrounding 
disability. In classical rhetorical theory, "commonplaces" were the standard sources 
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for invention, the places (in the mind) one went to in order to discover ( or invent) 
persuasive appeals. In Aristotelian rhetoric, the "commonplaces" are, in essence, 
"brainstorming" - where one begins looking in order "to see [all ] the available 
means of persuasion" (emphases ours). Establishing the greater and the lesser of 
the thing is often cited as the most foundational of the commonplaces. "Which is 
the greater and lesser of disabilities? When is a disability greater or lesser?" Sound 
familiar? Indeed - these questions are examples of the "commonplace" arguments 
surrounding disability, perpetrators of persuasion about disability. And there are at 
least twenty-eight more of these kinds of commonplaces in Aristotle's Rhetoric 
alone. Certainly, it might prove exhaustive and merely a "mental exercise" to 
examine all twenty-eight of these inventional commonplaces when disability is 
argued about. But we also think that such an exercise would begin to take us 
broader and deeper than some of our current limited ventures in disability studies. 
Such rhetorical studies of disability might have us looking, for example, at more 
than only medical models, or socio-political ones, or rehabilitative ones, or aesthetic 
ones and instead at what commonplaces undergird all of these models. And this, 
we think, would be theory-building at a new level. 
Rhetorical Criticism 
Currently, most activity in rhetoric is not in the area of theory-building, or 
even in speechifying, but in the criticism ofcultural, ideological, political, or aesthetic 
discourses. Nor is this criticism restricted to spoken or even written discourse. 
Current rhetorical critics examine gender portrayal on television, the appeal offamily 
photographs, the actions of anti-nuclear activists or the discursive construction of 
sports personalities. (5) Rhetorical terms like those outlined above are used to analyze 
the ways in which meaningful activity shapes our thoughts, our bodies and our 
lives. For example, a rhetorical critic might examine how manufacturers ofprosthetic 
devices establish their credibility (ethos) and appeal to the emotions (pathos) of a 
consuming audience, while explaining what their product does and how it works 
(logos). Thus, cochlear prostheses (implants) originally marketed to implant users 
failed to produce the demand that the manufacturer (the Cochlear Corporation) 
hoped for. A rhetorical analysis might explore how The Cochlear Corporation 
reconceived their appeal to address an audience of (parental) purchasers rather 
than of actual users, and how this shift necessitated an alteration in their logical and 
ethical appeals as well (like enlisting FDA approval for its use on children). , · 
Other rhetorical critics, like Walter Fisher, working from the assumption 
that human understanding works primarily through the coherence and fidelity of 
stories, examine cultural practices and events as narratives. One might thus examine 
narratives of disabled persons (Quasimodo in The Hunchback ofNotre Dame or the 
life of Bob Dole) or examine constructions of disability as narratives in and of 
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themselves. Thus, any category of disability might be seen as a cultural story that 
is compelled to follow a familiar and appealing plot with predictable characters: 
the cripple, misfit or freak (rendered, as suggested above, along a few basic lines: 
pitiful victim, vicious savage, over compensated savant, or gutsy over achiever), 
the potential (possibly platonic) love interest (consummated to the degree that the 
disability is overcome, compensated for or remedied), the philanthropic agent of 
change (the kind doctor, the long-suffering attendant, the disabled person him or 
herself, the federal government), the evil villain (the disability or the disabled person 
him or herself, or the cause of the accident, or the deadly disease producing germ). 
In this critical, rhetorical light, Rudolph the Red-nosed Reindeer works as a misfit-
becomes-leader disability narrative that appeals (a traditional term within rhetoric) 
to children and adults for specific reasons, satisfying culturally specific fears, hopes 
and desires, as all stories do. Rhetorical critics can read scientific, literary, legal or 
journalistic texts as stories - allegories about how a culture creates and enforces 
roles for its members, and the plots according to which those roles are expected to 
act. 
These methods of rhetorical criticism work alongside a number of others 
currently in use: metaphorical criticism; pentadic (Burkean) criticism; fantasy-
theme criticism; feminist, anti-racist, or queer criticism. In general, rhetorical 
criticism is moving away from attention to the "great speaker, great speech" model, 
and towards larger, more complex and diffuse social movements, cultural trends 
and ideological power relations. Rhetorical critics understand theorists like Michel 
Foucault, Mikhail Bakhtin, Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Helene Cixous to be rhetorical 
theorists and critics because of the ways in which they reconceive the power of 
discourse to shape human thought and action. Rather than "rhetorical criticism," 
critical rhetoric is becoming an increasingly popular term to describe the interest · 
of rhetoricians in calling attention to and advocating char..ges in existing power 
imbalances and the "discursive regimes" that maintain them. In this form, then, 
rhetoric as a theory, a practice and a tool for analysis is well aligned with the current 
direction of disability studies. Despite its inauspicious beginning, we are certain 
that rhetoric's long history and extensive vocabulary of textual strategies and tactics 
offers an unparalleled resource for analysing, understanding, and rethinking the 
nature of ability and disability, "normal" and "cripple." 
Notes 
1. Speech making was traditionally broken into five categories or "canons": 
invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery. This order indicate both the 
steps through which one would proceed as well as the general importance afforded 
to these activities by rhetoricians. 
2. The distinction between orator and rhetorician is something like that 
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between theory and practice. Rhetoricians established principles for effective 
discourse while orators were themselves public speakers in law-courts, legislative 
assemblies, or ceremonial occasions. 
3. All references in the first two sections of this essay can be found in The 
Rhetorical Tradition, Eds. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Boston: Beford, 
1988. This text is an excellent resource for anyone interested in pursuing the history 
and theory of rhetoric. 
4. A recent list generated in a graduate seminar on the history of rhetoric 
looked something like this: Invention; Arrangement; Style; Memory; Delivery; 
Ethos, Pathos, Logos; Kairos; Commonplaces; Enthymeme; Taste; Sublimity; 
Tropes; Proofs - Artistic and Nonartistic; Metaphor; Reason;Language as: Social 
Behavior, Intention, Interpretation, Determining Meaning, Creating Knowledge, 
Ideology, Power; Persuasion; Argument; Discourse; Discursive Formations; Ethics; 
Practical Reasoning; Speech Acts; Identification; Consubstantiation; Semiotics; 
Pragmatics; "Grammar"; Episteme (and Epistemic): Dialogue; Dialectic; 
Deconstruction; "Literary" vs. "Ordinary"; Belle Lettres; Sermonic; Burke's Pentad 
- Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose; The Rhetorical Triangle - Speaker, Subject, 
Audience; Presence. And were the challenge ever made, we are sure we could 
exhaust ourselves by locating the relevance of each of these terms in theorizing 
disability. 
Each of these examples in this section occur in Sonja Foss's Rhetorical 
Criticism: Theory and Practice, Waveland, 1996. This text outlines several of the 
most common avenues of rhetorical criticism currently used. 
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